ContinuumDAO Forum

Abstract

Authorise the ContinuumDAO governor (0x76FF2CB03175900F1D83328C82D27EA9aeaF2355) to create ten veCTM locks of 300 CTM each at a 208-week (4-year) duration, with the ten resulting NFTs minted to 0x7746Ca9F2Fb24993758e4731f5Ebae074c69Dd77 as an incentive pool.

The proposer will then manually distribute those ten veCTM NFTs to the first ten users to create an MPA Wallet, to incentivise the feedback we need to improve UX and fix bugs before marketing. That distribution is out of scope of this proposal — no Action below transfers, assigns, or reserves any NFT to any user.

No minting, no change to total supply, no parameter, configuration, or admin change.

Motivation

This proposal creates ten veCTM positions of 300 CTM each, locked for 208 weeks (four years), held at 0x7746Ca9F2Fb24993758e4731f5Ebae074c69Dd77. The proposer will then manually distribute these ten veCTM NFTs to the first ten users to create an MPA Wallet. That manual distribution is deliberately out of scope of this proposal: none of the Actions below transfers, assigns, or reserves any NFT to any user, and this proposal only creates and funds the ten locked positions. What the Actions do is put the incentive pool in place; who receives it, and when, is a separate manual step the DAO is not voting on here.

The purpose of the distribution is to incentivise user feedback. We want early MPA Wallet users to tell us where the product falls short — to report bugs, flag friction in onboarding and the transaction flow, and describe what confused them — so that we can improve the UX and address the issues and bugs they surface before we spend anything on marketing. Rewarding those first users with a four-year-locked position rather than a cash bounty is intentional: the reward matures only if the wallet they are helping us harden actually succeeds, so their incentive is to give us candid, specific, actionable feedback now rather than a favourable review.

The benefit to the DAO is direct and financial. Fixing UX defects and bugs before marketing lift visitor-to-subscriber conversion, which increases the number of MPA Wallet subscriptions, and MPA Wallet subscription revenue accrues to the DAO treasury. This proposal therefore converts 3,000 CTM of otherwise idle treasury liquidity into an incentive that raises subscription revenue across the hardening period — a benefit shared by all DAO members.

Cost, stated plainly. This is a real transfer of value, not a round trip. Each 300 CTM behind an NFT becomes withdrawable by that NFT's holder at unlock, and liquidationsEnabled() reads false, so there is no early-exit or penalty route. The DAO's cost is 3,000 CTM of treasury plus gas, deferred four years and contingent on the product succeeding.

Overview

Eleven on-chain actions on Linea (59144), executed atomically when the proposal passes:

• Action 0 approves the VotingEscrow proxy to pull exactly 3,000 CTM. The allowance is the exact sum of actions 1–10, so it returns to its present zero with no residual approval.
• Actions 1–10 are ten independent create_lock_for(uint256,uint256,address) calls, each locking 300 CTM for 125798400 seconds and minting one NFT to 0x7746Ca9F2Fb24993758e4731f5Ebae074c69Dd77.

create_lock_for pulls _value from msg.sender, so the governor must be the caller; the beneficiary address only receives the NFTs. Ten separate locks — rather than one 3,000 CTM lock — is required because the escrow transfers one _tokenId at a time; a single NFT could reward only one user. Voting power is identical either way, since veCTM is linear in amount at fixed duration.

This follows the precedent of the whitehat-reward Treasury proposal, which used the same function and the same 125798400-second (208-week) duration.

Type

Treasury — the on-chain transfer of DAO funds to a wallet, per the Constitution's definition. Not Admin (no contract modification, re-deployment, or proxy upgrade) and not Constitution (no amendment).

Scope

1. approve(address,uint256) on CTM (0x7581696b0ED142f6534E5797baaABBb9a1b27086 spender 0x221EC90B3B083A8501A37bdeb7035CeaedF3C31f, amount 3000000000000000000000.
2. Ten × create_lock_for(uint256,uint256,address) on the VotingEscrow proxy 0x221EC90B3B083A8501A37bdeb7035CeaedF3C31f: _value = 300000000000000000000, _lock_duration = 125798400, _to = 0x7746Ca9F2Fb24993758e4731f5Ebae074c69Dd77.

Out of scope: the manual distribution of the ten NFTs to end users, any claim/vesting/airdrop contract, any delegation policy, node attachment, and all MPA Wallet codebase changes.

Token ids are assigned at execution (++tokenId per call) and cannot be fixed in advance. They must be read from the ten Transfer events.

Success Criteria

• Ten Transfer mint events to 0x7746Ca9F2Fb24993758e4731f5Ebae074c69Dd77.
• Each of the ten tokens carries a locked amount of exactly 300 CTM.
• The governor→escrow CTM allowance returns to 0.
• The escrow CTM balance increases by exactly 3,000 CTM, and the governor's CTM balance decreases by exactly 3,000 CTM.

Distribution is explicitly outside these criteria; it will be evidenced only by ten later NFT transfers, not by anything this proposal executes.

Timeline

Single execution on proposal passage. Locks unlock approximately four years after execution. liquidationsEnabled() currently reads false, so withdraw after expiry is the only exit — there is no early-exit or penalty route.

Budget

3,000 CTM (3000e18) of existing DAO holdings at the governor, awarded as ten four-year-locked incentive positions to early MPA Wallet users, plus gas. No new issuance.

Risks and disclosures

• Custody risk. 0x7746Ca9F2Fb24993758e4731f5Ebae074c69Dd77 will hold all ten NFTs pending manual distribution. Because distribution is not enforceable on-chain by this proposal, voters are relying on the proposer's stated intent.
• Conflict of interest. That address is listed as "Hal/Selqui Agent" on the Constitution Committee List, and the proposal is submitted from this node's KeyGen. Post-execution it would hold ten veCTM NFTs plus additional votes.
• No early exit. The ten recipients cannot withdraw before the four-year unlock, and liquidationsEnabled() is false.
• Attachment caution. Voters and recipients should note that attaching a veCTM NFT to a node blocks transfer, merge, split and withdraw, and only one NFT may be attached per KeyGen. None of the ten should be attached before distribution if they are to be transferred.

Alignment with Vision & Mission

Fixing UX defects and bugs before marketing raises MPA Wallet subscription conversion, and subscription revenue accrues to the DAO treasury — funding DAO-managed infrastructure and connectivity from improved product quality rather than from new issuance. The reward is paid in four-year-locked veCTM, aligning early users with the DAO's long-term success rather than a one-off payout.

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Vote: For / Against / Abstain.

Abstract

This proposal rewards a whitehat researcher, 1nc0gn170 (0xCccbB73ea22c9749D22089Ee617bd715b143b63D), who identified several bugs — including critical ones — in DAO protocol contracts and disclosed them unconditionally, without demands. Findings: (1) 1/4 Power Attack — a multi-option Delta proposal could be constructed so a malicious option executed regardless of the vote outcome, because no "none of the above" (NOTA) option was required; fixed by always including NOTA in Delta proposals. (2) Double Fee Collection — the CTM token, built on CTMERC20 with its cross-chain transfer mechanism, burned the amount and then took a fee, so a portion of CTM vanished between transfers; fixed. (3) No Vote Win — a Delta proposal declaring more winning options than were voted on still executed an unvoted-for option as a winner; fixed. The disclosure prompted DAO maintainers to run further internal audits, and correspondence with QuillAudit revealed further bugs via their QuillShield tool. The reward is 25,000 CTM locked 4 years as veCTM.

Motivation

Timely, no-strings disclosure protected the DAO from flaws in both its governance machinery and its token. Bug 1 was a voting-manipulation vector in the DAO's own proposal system; bug 2 silently destroyed CTM in transit. Rewarding this work states plainly that security research is valued as the DAO's public good, and that the DAO intends to keep a proven, good-faith contributor — the kind of person we wish to keep as a contributor. Paying in 4-year veCTM rather than liquid CTM gives him an aligned long-term stake in the DAO instead of a one-off payout.

Overview

This proposal originates from the committee (core contributors).

Type

Treasury. The action transfers 25,000 CTM of value to the whitehat's wallet on Linea.

Scope

1. The governor approves veCTM (0x221EC90B3B083A8501A37bdeb7035CeaedF3C31f) to spend 25,000 CTM.
2. The governor calls create_lock_for(25000e18, 125798400, 0xCccbB73ea22c9749D22089Ee617bd715b143b63D) on veCTM, creating a 4-year veCTM NFT owned by 1nc0gn170.
3. Public record linking the reward to github.com/ContinuumDAO/vectm/issues/5.

Success Criteria

N/A: the disclosure of the bugs has already been done. The observable completion signal for this proposal is a veCTM NFT for 25,000 CTM / 208 weeks owned by 0xCccb…b63D.

Timeline

Immediate upon execution.

Budget

25,000 CTM (25000e18), from existing DAO holdings at the governor; no new issuance.

Community discussion

The Ideas & Suggestions stage is intentionally omitted; this is a proposal from a committee KeyGen, the preferred KeyGen on this node.

Reference

The fixes are public and accessible on our GitHub at https://github.com/ContinuumDAO/vectm/issues/5

Abstract

This proposal asks the DAO to recognise the veCTM Marketplace smart contract, deployed on Linea at 0x92557d38beAe4658d3c03A02F349FFB60c3bfFA5, as the official marketplace of ContinuumDAO, to include it in the Continuum frontend UI, and to include it in DAO communications as the official marketplace.

It is a signalling Decision. No on-chain actions are included and no DAO funds are moved.

Motivation

The marketplace benefits the DAO in three concrete ways.

1. Fee revenue. Fees are paid on every successful NFT transaction. The fee is taken from the gross payment made from the buyer to the seller. The fee rate depends on the tier of token sold, with higher tiers inducing higher fee rates, to a maximum of 1%. Fees flow to the DAO treasury.
2. An on-ramp for new MPA wallet operators. A marketplace allows new users of the MPA wallet to buy a veCTM and, provided it has the threshold locked amount, attach it to their node and avail of the free subscription model.
3. Two-way liquidity. Current holders who do not wish to retain membership of the DAO have an off-ramp; prospective DAO members who wish to join have an on-ramp. Exit and entry no longer depend on bilateral deals.

Overview

The marketplace is deployed and live on Linea at 0x92557d38beAe4658d3c03A02F349FFB60c3bfFA5. It supports buying, selling and auctioning of veCTM tokens.

The fee policy is a percentage fee on each completed sale, capped at 1%, subject to DAO change. The 1% figure is a DAO-set ceiling: the fee applies per completed sale, taken from the gross buyer-to-seller payment, and the DAO may adjust the rate within that cap by a later Decision.

Type of proposal

Decision — a DAO yes/no decision which does not necessarily have an on-chain action. It is explicitly not Admin (no contract modification, re-deployment or proxy upgrade), not Treasury (no DAO funds are transferred by any action), and not Constitution (no amendment to the Constitution).

Scope

1. Formally recognise 0x92557d38beAe4658d3c03A02F349FFB60c3bfFA5 (Linea) as the official ContinuumDAO veCTM marketplace.
2. Include the marketplace in the Continuum frontend UI, so members can discover listings and complete a purchase or sale from the DAO interface.
3. Include the marketplace in DAO communications as the official marketplace, publishing the deployment address and network.
4. Adopt the fee policy stated above: a percentage fee on each completed sale, capped at 1%, subject to DAO change.

Proposer / team background

Proposers are Hal, marketplace and DAO lead developer, and Selqui, MPA wallet lead developer.

Alignment with Vision & Mission

Recognising and integrating the marketplace keeps DAO activity on a single member-facing surface, makes the venue's economics legible, and supports DAO-managed infrastructure by routing marketplace fees to the treasury. It also lowers the barrier to acquiring the veCTM position that node operation depends on.

Risks

• Frontend integration adds maintenance surface; mitigated by scoping the integration to the official venue rather than building a parallel marketplace.
• "Capped at 1%" may be misread as a fixed rate; the cap is a DAO-set ceiling, changeable by a later Decision.
• A signalling proposal does not bind execution; adoption relies on the teams acting on the mandate.

Budget and timeline

Budget: none — no DAO funds are moved and the proposal carries no on-chain actions. Timeline: frontend integration and communications are scheduled by the contributors, subject to this Decision passing. No on-chain execution step is required.

Success criteria

The marketplace is recognised as the official venue, surfaced in the frontend UI, reflected in DAO communications, and the fee line is recorded as a percentage capped at 1%, subject to DAO change.

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Vote: For / Against / Abstain.