A Proposal to Create a Voting Escrow NFT and Governance for ContinuumDAO
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Hi @Raini-Ng, I appreciate the comment. I agree about the veMulti display issue, it should be more readable.
As for OpenSea, I believe they get the image from the NFT smart contract once and cache it for further use, meaning the data displayed on most of the NFTs on OpenSea is not up to date. Not to worry, we'll always keep this data up to date on our site.
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@Everyone, thanks very much for the feedback and suggestions. I have already created a repository on GitHub with the bare bones of the system, pending successful vote. Please reach out to me on this thread or on TG, any further concerns or suggestions are welcome.
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The Final Vote on this is now live. I will leave this thread open for on-going discussion :- https://forum.continuumdao.org/topic/16/003-final-vote-the-creation-of-a-voting-escrow-nft-and-governance-for-continuumdao
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Tally Integration: A time lock provision will be included to allow the Committee to prevent the automatic execution of a voting result within a defined window following a successful vote.
Im interested to learn what or how many votes will cause an overide so it cant be abused on the otherside.
cheers,
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@murchadh Thanks for bringing this up. We have two methods of executing governance - Snapshot and Tally. With Snapshot, a Committee member must post the proposal, but with Tally, anyone with sufficient voting power of 1% can do so and the result is automatically executed, so that in theory a malicious actor could submit and pass a proposal, which would drain the Treasury for instance automatically. The time delay gives the Committee an opportunity to stop this, since only proposals that do not 'further the Vision and Mission of ContinuumDAO as laid out in this Constitution' should be allowed to execute. This is a safety mechanism that many other DAOs also use.
The Constitution also says that 'if the proposal is re-submitted unaltered and if it once again passes, then the Committee may not squash the vote outcome for a second time'. This limits the power of the Committee to ignore the will of the DAO.
